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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
action abated upon dissolution. 12 Delaware, by express statutory
provision,' 3 requires the corporation to sue or be sued in its corporate
name until the end of the three-year period, at which time the names
of the trustees are substituted for the purpose of completing suit.
While Florida provides by statute1 4 that an action already pending
will not abate by reason of dissolution, provided the names of the
trustees or receivers are entered upon the record, the concluding
clause of Section 612.50 is the only statutory language indicating that
a suit still pending at the expiration of the three-year extension period
may be prosecuted to judgment; and even this is not free from
ambiguity. It is noteworthy, therefore, that in the instant case, in
which the action was commenced after dissolution and was still
pending after three years, the Court sanctioned continuation of the
cause. It did so, however, with the sound caveat that the parties
must "move promptly." 5
SoL H.

PRocroR

DIVORCE: FLORIDA ALIMONY SUIT AFTER VALID
EX PARTE FOREIGN DIVORCE

Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950)1
Respondent husband secured a Cuban divorce predicated on constructive desertion, a ground sufficient under both Cuban and Florida
law. His wife did not appear, and the issue of alimony was not
raised. Subsequently he remarried. Thereafter his first wife sued
him in Florida for alimony unconnected with causes of divorce.2
121n

re Booth's Drug Store, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Va. 1937); Trower v.

Stonebraker-Zea Livestock Co., 17 F. Supp. 687 (1937); Ex parte Davis, 230 Ala.
668, 162 So. 306 (1935); see 16 FiLrcHER, ConuotAnioNs §8143 (Rev. ed. 1942).
13
DEL. REv. CODE §2078 (1935), Atkins v. W. A. Harriman & Co., 69 F.2d
66 1(2d
Cir. 1934).
4
FLA. STAT. §612.53 (1949).
15 At p. 9.

1On rehearing, Chapman, J., dissented, but not on the substantive point involved; his position was that the bill should not be dismissed and that complainant
wife should be allowed to amend it. Application for certiorari was denied, 71

Sup. Ct. 90 (1950).
2

FLA.

STAT.

§65.10 (1949): "If any husband having ability to maintain or
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CASE COMMENTS

The chancellor dismissed her bill, held the Cuban divorce valid in
all respects, and enjoined further attack on it. On appeal, HErD,
(1) the Cuban decree should be recognized in Florida as a dissolution of the marital status; (2) complainant was not on the facts
entitled to. the relief sought; (3) her right to alimony was not destroyed by the foreign decree, and an appropriate proceeding to
obtain it would lie. Decree affirmed in part and reversed in part,
Chief Justice Adams and Justice Terrell dissenting.
The Court does not discredit the Ogden v. Ogden3 requirement
that ". . . the foreign judgment must partake of the elements that
would support it if procured in this country."4 Desertion by the
wife, found by the Cuban court and later by the master and the
chancellor in the instant case, is a ground for divorce under both
Cuban and Florida law.5 The Supreme Court of Florida further
notes that substituted service provided by Cuban law was made; 6
that the wife had actual notice and an opportunity to defend in the
Cuban proceeding;7 that she and her husband had resided in Cuba
for several years after their marriage and that Cuba had remained
his domicil and also the marital domicil; 8 that she was no stranger
to that forum and could speedily and inexpensively have reached
Havana from Miami; 9 and that she had remained silent for more
than three years after the Cuban divorce before filing her instant
bill. 10
Since complainant wife was guilty of constructive desertion, she
has no standing under Section 65.10, which requires a finding of
fault in the husband.1 In order to enable her to obtain alimony,
contribute to the maintenance of his wife or minor children shall fail to do so, the
wife, living with him or living apart from him through his fault, may obtain such
maintenance or contribution upon bill filed and suit prosecuted as in other chancery
causes ... .'

Fla. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (1947).
41d. at 610, 83 So.2d at 874.
3159
5

FLA. STAT.

§6.5.03(7) (1949); see the .instant opinion at p. 468.

6At p. 467.
7

At p. 468.

BAt p. 470.
91bid.
1oAt p. 469.
living apart from him through his fault.
n1See note 2 supra,
Query: Does recognition of foreign divorce decree foreclose later inquiry as to
fault, thus eliminating possibility of invoking §65.10 as a means of obtaining
alimony in such situations?
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the Florida Court had the alternative either of declaring the Cuban
divorce invalid, thereby unjustifiably causing great hardship to the
second wife, or of following the United States Supreme Court in its
doctrine of "divisible divorce." 1 2 This in effect recognizes the validity
of a foreign ex parte decree in so far as it dissolves the marital res
and those dependent rights, such as dower, inseparably attached
thereto, and yet refuses to recognize adjudication of those marital
economic rights which are not lost merely upon dissolution of the
res, such as alimony. 1 3 The use of "divisible divorce" as a legal term,
however, is likely to prove misleading unless one bears in mind that
it is, in effect, the rights connected with marriage which are divided,
rather than the decree itself.
In full faith and credit cases involving a prior support order rendered in the wife's favor by a court of the original matrimonial
domicil, 1 4 the United States Supreme Court has held that the later
ex parte decree severs the marital status but does not deprive the
wife, who is not under the in personam jurisdiction of the divorcing
court, of her right under the support order, this being in the nature
of a vested property right. 15 The instant case presents no previously
rendered Florida support order. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
of Florida holds that, since the right of a wife to insist upon alimony
is a personal one arising out of the husband's common law duty to
support her, this right cannot be destroyed by a foreign decree based
on constructive service in a suit in which she does not appear. 10
The major issue in this case is whether the doctrine of "divisible
divorce" is part of the law of Florida. The Court, in seeking to
achieve a result just as to both the present and the former wife,
applies this doctrine, despite a vigorous dissent. The decision preserves on the one hand the husband's right to remarry, and on the
other leaves the ex-wife free to seek relief under Sections 65.04(8) 117
and 65.0818 of the Florida Statutes. If a similar situation should,
12 For a general discussion see Haslup, Divisible Divorce, 3 U. oF FLA. L. Rzv.
145, 159 (1950).
13 See the instant opinion at p. 472, n.2, for a clear-cut differentation.

14 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948).
15Haslup, supra note 12.
16For effect of appearance by both spouses see Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S.
343 (1948), followed in Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948).
7""That the defendant has obtained a divorce from the complainant in any
other state or country."
18
"In every decree of divorce in a suit by the wife, the court shall make such
orders touching the maintenance, alimony and suit money of the wife, or any
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